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C
ompetition is at the heart of the capitalist paradigm of economic devel-
opment. Pundits blame insufficient (or the utter lack of) competition in
key sectors for the economic stagnation in many developing countries.
Not surprisingly, policy recommendations offered by most multilat-
eral institutions—the Washington Consensus being a prime example—have cen-
tered on promoting competition as the key to economic development. The ac-
celeration of globalization, particularly in the flow of goods and services, re-
flects this policy disposition.
In this context, economic success has been closely associated with the
level of competitiveness, that is, the ability to compete. However, there has been
controversy in defining the relevant entities involved and the corresponding
concept of competitiveness. Specifically, while competitiveness is readily de-
fined at the firm level, the concept becomes a bit vague when applied at the
industry and national levels.
Following Buckley et al. (1988), the view of competitiveness  at the firm
level can be given as follows:
A firm is competitive if it can produce products and services of
superior quality and lower costs than its domestic and international
competitors. Competitiveness is synonymous with a firm’s long-run
profit performance and its ability to compensate its employees and
provide superior returns to its owners.
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Hence, a firm’s competitiveness can be measured by its price relative to
competitors, market share and degree of profitability over a relevant period of
time. If the firm is an exporter, market share can be measured at the global level.
Product quality can also be assessed and compared.
Many analysts—mostly noneconomists—have extended this concept directly
to the national level. For example, national competitiveness has been defined as
the “ability of a country to produce goods and services that meet the test of inter-
national markets and simultaneously to maintain and expand the real income of its
citizens.”2 This definition applies to the term “international competitiveness” and
brings to mind President Bill Clinton’s remark that each nation is “like a big cor-
poration competing in the global market place.” The rapid pace of globalization
has definitely reinforced this perspective.
The analogy implies that countries compete with each other for shares in the
global export market and the equivalent of “profitability” at the national level
would be sustained economic growth. Meanwhile, the counterpart of “price” at
the macroeconomic level would be such measures as the real effective exchange
rate and unit labor cost. For example, an appreciation of the country’s currency in
real terms or increase in its unit labor cost would lead to a decline in national
competitiveness.
PROBLEMS WITH THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL COMPETITIVE-
NESS
Extending the concept of competitiveness from the firm level to the national level
thus seems like a rather straightforward process. However, closer analysis reveals
several problems with this approach. One, countries do not necessarily compete
with each other when engaging in international trade. More often than not, inter-
national trade is a positive sum game where all countries that are involved benefit.
This is the fundamental tenet underlying the traditional theory of international
trade based on comparative advantage. Hence, a falling share in exports in a par-
ticular commodity does not necessarily imply a loss of national competitiveness
but simply a shifting of comparative advantage. Only the statement that a country
is less competitive in a particular sector does have significance.
Two, even if a country consistently experiences a persistent trade deficit
(meaning that its exports continually lag behind its imports), this does not neces-
sarily imply that its firms are losing competitiveness. The United States has been
recording a trade deficit for the past decade or so, but this hardly matters since 90
percent of output is sold in the domestic market. Meanwhile, for a typical devel-
oping country, a trade deficit would likely imply that it is applying an intertemporal
2 Cited by Haque (1995) and attributed to the US Commission of Industrial Competitiveness.YAP 3
budget constraint (i.e., mortgaging its future for a chance to expand its economy
in the present). Thus, using trade performance to gauge an economy’s competi-
tiveness should depend on the nature of the economy or its stage of development.
Comparing Singapore and the United States based on trade performance, for ex-
ample, is a meaningless exercise.
Three, economic growth emanates from many factors apart from an increase
in exports. Unless national competitiveness is interpreted in very broad terms so
as to encompass total output growth, it simply becomes a development or growth
strategy, and there is no need to consider it separately (Lall 2001a). Hence, not all
policies associated with accelerated economic growth should be classified as strat-
egies to increase competitiveness. As Lall (2001a) points out, unless national com-
petitiveness is interpreted in very broad terms so as to encompass total output
growth, it simply becomes a development or growth strategy, and there is no need
to consider it separately. Hence, not all policies associated with accelerated eco-
nomic growth should be classified as strategies to increase competitiveness.
Four, the bulk in exports can come from resource endowments, such as in
the case of Indonesia and Malaysia prior to the 1970s. Or else, a surge in exports
results from being a low-cost producer of a particular commodity. There should
be an important distinction between having some activities that compete on the
basis of static endowments but fail to produce growth (or lose their competitive
edge as wages rise), and having a broad competitive base that is capable of re-
maining competitive as incomes grow (Lall 2001b). This issue is directly related
to this paper’s proposed definition of competitiveness.
Finally, using aggregate prices like the real effective exchange rate and unit
labor costs is not without difficulties. A rise or fall in either measure can be ac-
companied by both strong and weak economic performance. In other words, there
are some ambiguous relations between these price measures and national com-
petitiveness.
NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: A MORE USEFUL AND PRACTI-
CAL CONCEPT
Although some economic theoreticians have been intensely critical of the concept
of national competitiveness, these problems cited above should not lead to the
abandonment of the concept. One reason is that the idea behind national competi-
tiveness—or international competitiveness of an economy—is intuitively sound
and simple: people care about how well they do compared to others, individually
as well as a nation (Fagerberg 1996). Here, it is the method of comparison that can
be modified to make the concept more robust.
Another reason for the relevance of this concept is that there is still a need
for policy formulation at the macroeconomic level that will increase competitive-PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 4
ness at the microeconomic level. While firms will be the ultimate beneficiaries of
such policy, proper analysis and design require intermediate targets. Therefore,
the concept of competitiveness must somehow be extended to a more aggregate
level without encountering the aforementioned difficulties.
Therefore, one needs to be more specific in defining the term “national com-
petitiveness” and measures associated with the idea. The first step is to distinguish
between the concepts of competitive performance and competitive potential (Buckley
et al. 1988). The simplest way to differentiate the two is by observing that perfor-
mance is an outcome of potential. Table 1 gives possible measures of both perfor-
mance and potential at the firm level. The core of the debate is whether these mea-
sures can be extended to the national level without encountering uncertainties.
As explained earlier, extending the concept of market share and profitabil-
ity to the national level leads to problems. This is true also at the industry level.
Hence, at both the national and industry levels, competitiveness should deal solely
with potential, and policies to increase the economy’s or industry’s competitive
potential. The elements of competitiveness potential are:
 Price and cost competitiveness;
 Productivity; and
 Technology indicators.
As will be discussed in the next section of this paper, the concept of price
and cost competitiveness is ambiguous at the national level. What will be left then
are productivity and technology indicators, where the latter characterize the tech-
nological capability of an economy.
Productivity refers to the efficiency in the use of resources and factors of
production. Aggregating productivity across firms—even if it is only labor pro-
ductivity—raises a number of delicate issues. First and foremost is the aggrega-
tion problem, which questions the validity of postulating a production function at
the macroeconomic level. The measure of labor productivity, which is total output
divided by employment, assumes that this production function exists. Second, it
has been acknowledged that the key to raising per capita income over the long
term is productivity growth (Fagerberg 1988). Hence, if one were to include “pro-
Table 1. Measures of competitiveness at the firm level
Performance Potential
Market share (both domestic Price and cost competitiveness; productivity; and
export markets); profitability technology indicators
Source: Buckley et al. 1988YAP 5
“productivity” in the analysis, all policies associated with an accelerated economic
growth would be classified as strategies to increase competitiveness. As men-
tioned earlier, this situation must be avoided.
Unlike market share, profitability and productivity, the concept of technologi-
cal capability can be extended from the firm level to the national level without any
form of ambiguity. For example, R&D expenditures can be aggregated, and the
number of scientists and engineers across sectors can be combined. Moreover, mac-
roeconomic policies generally affect technological development in various sectors
in the same direction. It should also be noted that increased labor productivity at the
firm level is oftentimes brought about by an improvement in technology.
An extensive literature on the linkage between technology, trade perfor-
mance and economic growth provides a solid framework for analysis.3 In the older
Keynesian approach, exports were considered exogenous and growth as endog-
enous, which implied that the causation runs from trade to growth. Subsequently,
the exogenous factors were determined to be at a deeper level and assumed to
impact on trade performance. Of particular interest were nonprice factors, among
which technology was recognized as the prime candidate. Two advances in eco-
nomic theory have brought technological capability—the major element of nonprice
competitiveness—to the forefront.
The development of the New Trade Theory represents attempts to relax the
restrictive assumptions of the neoclassical framework, which assumed the exist-
ence of competitive markets, factor substitutability and mobility and profit maxi-
mization.  The new theory sought to extend and develop the traditional framework
by incorporating in its analysis such issues as the treatment of economies of scale,
externalities, technical progress, product differentiation, and monopolistic and
oligopolistic situations (Haque 1995).
  A parallel development occurred in the theory of economic growth that
likewise stressed the importance of human resource development and technologi-
cal accumulation: the development of endogenous growth models. This model
hypothesizes that investment (either in physical capital, human capital, or R&D
activities) generates externalities that offset the decreasing returns to inputs.  In
this context, technological development becomes endogenous, thus bringing ex-
ogenous factors that determine trade performance to another level. Both the new
trade theory and endogenous growth theory now manage to shift the focus on
technology capability as the primary determinant of an economy’s competitiveness.
 Technological capability will be more relevant if defined at the industry
level rather than at a national level. One reason is that, historically, an upward
movement in the technological ladder meant a shift from agriculture and other
3 See Fagerberg (1996) for a brief review of the theoretical and empirical literature.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 6
primary producing activities to the manufacturing industry. In this framework,
sustained competitiveness means the ability of nations to diversify industrial ac-
tivity from simple to advanced technologies (Lall 2001a).
Differentiating technological capability across sectors in manufacturing
would provide a benchmark on the existing technological structure of the economy.
In practical terms, technology-intensive structures offer better prospects for fu-
ture growth because their products tend to grow faster, be highly income elastic,
create new demand and substitute for older products (Lall 2000). Thus, studying
the technological structure of the manufacturing sector can identify both trade
prospects and the potential for sustained economic growth. Another compelling
reason for differentiation at the industry level is that selective interventions—if
called for—vary across different economic sectors.
MEASURING COMPETITIVENESS
As shown earlier,  measures of competitive performance at the firm level are
straightforward. In terms of competitive potential, there are various measures of
technological capability. These include R&D expenditure, employment of quali-
fied scientists and engineers, and number of patents. Some of these are readily
extended to the industry and national level.
Meanwhile, productivity is normally couched in terms of labor productiv-
ity. Relatedly, total factor productivity is a dubious concept even at the firm level.
At the aggregate level, total factor productivity is nothing more than a weighted
average of the increase in factor rewards. This has absolutely nothing to do with
either competitiveness or long-term economic growth.
In this section, various measures associated with national competitiveness
will be discussed. This includes the indices reported by the World Economic Fo-
rum and used to rank countries. The last part of the section deals with possible
measures focusing on technological capability.
PRICE COMPETITIVENESS MEASURES AT THE NATIONAL
LEVEL
The most frequently used indicator of national price competitiveness are those
measures of relative prices and/or costs expressed in a common currency: the real
effective exchange rate. In its nominal version, the effective exchange rate con-
sists of a weighted average of bilateral rates reflecting their relative importance to
the economic issue being analyzed (Turner and Van t’dack 1993).
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where REERj  is the real effective exchange rate of home country j;  WPIi is the
wholesale price index of partner country i; CPIj is the consumer price index of
home country j; eij is the exchange rate index between country i and j expressed in
foreign currency per local currency; and wij is share of country i in the total trade
of country j. The use of CPI and WPI attempts to distinguish, in a rather rough
way, between the prices of nontradeables and tradeables, respectively.
In this framework, an increase in domestic prices relative to prices of trad-
ing partners would lead to an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (i.e.,
a rise in REER or real effective exchange rate). The same effect occurs if the
domestic currency appreciates, which translates into an increase in eij. Theoreti-
cally, an appreciation of real effective exchange rate would make exports more
costly, causing the country to lose competitiveness and ultimately resulting in a
fall in its global market share.
Applying the  REER to measure competitiveness assumes underlying struc-
tural factors are constant and focuses on the kinds of short-term macroeconomic
management that affect prices of national goods and services relative to other
countries. Such a measure is an ambiguous indicator of a country’s competitiveness.
Such is ambiguous because, among others, international relative price or
cost position can be both cause and result of a country’s economic performance.
For example, the appreciation of the REER can be explained by the Balassa-
Samuelson effect and need not necessarily lead to an overvalued currency. An-
other source of difficulty, which is true of all aggregate measures, is that the real
effective exchange rate can be given many distinct statistical forms using prices,
wages and other costs. There is no one ideal measure and the large number of
different measures that are in common use often diverge appreciably (Turner and
Van t’dack 1993).
Empirically, the REER is not a reliable indicator of a country’s competitive-
ness if the latter is measured by trade movements. Figure 1 shows the average
percentage change of the  real effective exchange rate and average trade balance-
GDP ratio for selected developing countries. Theoretically, countries should fall
in the second and fourth quadrants—i.e., an increase or appreciation of  real effec-
tive exchange rate should be associated with a lower trade balance—but the graph
shows no discernible pattern. In a study of the East Asian financial crisis, it was
shown that among the five crisis-affected economies, Korea had a very stable  real
effective exchange rate in the seven-year period prior to 1997 but experienced the
largest deterioration in its current account balance. Meanwhile, the Philippines
had the sharpest appreciation but experienced only a relatively mild deterioration
in its current account balance (Rana and Yap 2001).
 Another important indicator of competitiveness is unit labor cost (ULC) in
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manufacturing. Labor costs are also the most easily quantifiable, compared to,
say, the cost of capital. Unit labor cost is defined as total compensation C per hour
employed H divided by productivity, where the latter is measured as total output
O per hour employed (Hooper and Larin 1989). In equation form, this can be shown
as:
where ULC is the unit labor cost.
The central problem concerning intercountry comparisons of labor costs is
how to translate the costs calculated for individual countries into comparable or
common-currency units. The United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion (UNIDO) publishes industrial statistics from various countries that include
total salaries and wages and valued added for the manufacturing sector. However
such is available only in current prices measured in local currency. Nonetheless,
the UNIDO data set may be used to calculate unit labor costs that are comparable
across countries. The formula for this may be given as:
This formula is valid under the assumption that the exchange rate adjusts
over the long term to reflect purchasing power parity conditions.
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A rise in a country’s ULC relative to other countries should lead to a decline
in its competitiveness and therefore translate into a lower global market share.
However, empirical evidence shows that over the long-term market share for ex-
ports and relative unit costs or prices tend to move together—the so-called Kaldor
paradox. Figure 2, shows the average growth of unit labor cost in the manufactur-
ing sector plotted against the trade balance-GDP ratio for selected Asian coun-
tries. The pattern indicated in the graph tends to support the Kaldor paradox.
One conclusion that can be drawn from this brief analysis is that the stan-
dard macroeconomic indicators of price competitiveness do not mimic their coun-
terparts at the firm level. Hence, at the national level, competitiveness is associ-
ated more closely with nonprice factors (e.g., technological capability).
THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
The popularity of the idea of international competitiveness was further enhanced
with the construction of the World Economic Forum’s competitiveness index, which
was published in the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). A similar index is
prepared by the Institute for Management Development (IMD) and published in
the World Competitiveness Report. However, because of the similarity of the two
indices—they had at one time been a single outfit—and the lack of a detailed
methodology from the IMD, only the GCR index is discussed in this section.
Figure 2. Trade balance to GDP ratio and growth rate of unit labor cost
Source of basic data: UNIDO Industrial Statistics, 1996-2002PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 10
The GCR index will be evaluated using three major criteria. One, its under-
lying framework will be compared with the definition of national competitive-
ness. Two, its consistency with economic theory will be analyzed based on the
discussion of Lall (2001a). Lastly, the empirical soundness of the GCR methodol-
ogy will be evaluated.
The GCR deals with two distinct but complementary approaches to the analy-
sis of economic competitiveness. The first measure, which is termed the Growth
Competitiveness Index (GCI), analyzes how each of the national economies has
the structures, institutions and policies in place for economic growth over the
medium term (McArthur and Sachs 2002). Meanwhile, the Current Competitive-
ness index (CCI) examines the microeconomic foundations of competitiveness,
which consist of company operating practices and strategies as well as quality of
inputs, infrastructure, institutions, and set of regulations and other policies that
constitute the firms’ business environment (Porter 2002).
The authors of the GCR indices agree that the market share view of national
competitiveness is deeply flawed. They argue that to understand competitiveness
at this level, it is necessary to move beyond the misleading metaphor of direct
market competition and instead relate competitiveness to the sources of a nation’s
prosperity. At this point the GCR concept deviates sharply from the proposal laid
out earlier in this paper.
It is true that the GCR indices are clearly concerned with dynamic compara-
tive advantage and place technological dynamism at the core of building such an
advantage (Lall 2001a). However, in practice, the indices are derived from the
notion that “true competitiveness rests on productivity… A nation’s standard of
living is determined by the productivity of its economy, which is measured by the
value of goods and services produced per unit of the nation’s human, capital, and
natural resources” (Porter 2002).
The reservations against using “productivity” at an aggregate level have
already been laid out and will not be repeated here. The actual methodology de-
scribed in the GCR shows that the indices are too broad in scope to be considered
as measures of competitiveness. The GCI is defined as:
Immediately, it can be observed that the policy areas included are quite
exhaustive and the objective of analysis is more apt for economic growth, and not
merely for competitiveness. This conclusion is supported by the manner the ele-
ments of the three main indices are obtained, which is by regression analysis using
as a dependent variable a composite indicator based on per-capita GDP growth.YAP 11
The CCI is constructed in a similar fashion but focuses on microeconomic
factors. Its manner of analysis is almost an exercise in tautology. Higher GDP
growth is related to better physical infrastructure, easier access to capital, more
highly trained human resources and more sophisticated consumers. All these are
well known; what is still open to debate is the appropriate development path to take.
The overall framework of the GCR competitiveness indices is largely based
on neoclassical concepts.4 Despite the emphasis on technological dynamism and
reservations about untrammeled globalization, the approach to the technological
strategies needed at the microeconomic level is restricted. The oversimplified view
of the process of structural change leads to a bias toward the strong neoclassical
position and what is termed the market-friendly government role—as opposed to
selective intervention. While this is not necessarily incorrect, the next section will
analyze the shortcomings of this view.
The CCI is largely based on Michael Porter’s framework known as the com-
petitiveness diamond. Competitive advantages—as opposed to comparative ad-
vantage—arise from firm-level efforts to develop new products, make improve-
ments and develop better brands or delivery methods: to innovate, in a broad
sense. Innovation, in turn, is influenced by conditions given by four elements of
the “diamond”: factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting in-
dustries, and the context for firm strategy and rivalry.  However, Porter does not
provide a theory of competitive advantage in economic terms. The discussion
only explains post hoc, and in a rather diffused way, why certain activities have
succeeded in certain countries. The link between competitive advantages at the
firm level, where the approach is most useful, and the national level remains weak
and unsubstantiated.
Empirically, the main problem lies with the regressions results (i.e., whether
or not these are spurious). In technical terms, there seems to be no test for
stationarity of the residuals. The lack of theoretical robustness also makes the
interpretation of causality problematic. For example, “presence of demanding regu-
latory standards” and “stringency of environmental regulations” have among the
highest adjusted coefficients of determination but the theoretical basis for their
causal impact on output is so unconvincing that the results appear meaningless or
misleading (Lall 2001). Another problem is that causality can actually run in both
directions for several of the variables considered.
There is also concern about aggregating different indices into a single num-
ber, which is similar to the criticism raised against the assumption of continuity in
utility functions. In standard choice theory, a consumption bundle may lie in the
same indifference curve so long as commodity x can substitute for commodity y.
4 The discussion in this paragraph and the next is largely based on Lall (2001), pp. 1506-1510.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 12
In the case of competitiveness, a country may have a skewed distribution of the
relevant elements for economic growth and may still outrank another country.
Singular measures generally fail to capture the nuances involved in defining na-
tional competitiveness.5
MEASURES OF COMPETITIVENESS: A PRACTICAL AND USEFUL
APPROACH
Given the shortcomings of both the macroeconomic measures of price competi-
tiveness and the GCR indices, the next step would be to develop measures that
would complement the “practical and useful” definition outlined earlier. Fortu-
nately, the inaugural Industrial Development Report of the UNIDO (2002) has
proposed a framework along this line. This framework is much more concise than
the GCR approach and more consistent with the definition of competitiveness
explained earlier.
The measures used by UNIDO are divided into two categories. The first set
of indicators is combined to gauge the ability of countries to produce and export
manufactures competitively. The second set focuses on the “drivers” of industrial
performance, or on factors that affect the first set. The classification is analogous
to the performance/potential distinction made earlier.
Four indicators comprise the first set: manufacturing value-added per capita,
manufactured exports per capita, and the shares of medium- and high-tech prod-
ucts in manufacturing value added and in manufactured exports. Rather than mea-
suring “competitive performance,” these indicators provide more of a technologi-
cal “profile” of the manufacturing sector. The first two indicators reflect industrial
capacity while the last two are a gauge of technological complexity and industrial
upgrade (UNIDO 2002). It can be readily observed that any reference to global
market share is not included.
The major drawback in the UNIDO approach is the aggregation of these
factors into a composite number called the competitive industrial performance
(CIP) index (Footnote 5). Since the economies being analyzed are at various stages
of development and have different orientations, it would be more appropriate to
examine the individual indicators. A comparison of four selected countries illus-
trates the benefits of this suggestion (Table 2).
The data for the United States and Singapore show why it is inadvisable to
focus solely on exports as a basis for measuring competitiveness. The ranking
based on manufactured exports and manufacturing value added is quite disparate.
5 Think about comparing two cars A and B. Car A has a very modern engine but has three wheels only; hence,
it cannot run on the road. On the other hand, Car B has an older type of engine but has complete accessories.
If the characteristics of the cars are quantified and the values combined to form an index, it is still conceivable
for Car A to outrank Car B even if the former is not functioning at all.YAP 13
The United States is ranked seventh in terms of manufacturing value added but
only 26th in terms of manufactured exports. Other indicators give a more accurate
picture. Meanwhile, a comparison of the Philippines and Thailand (and even be-
tween the United States and the Philippines) illustrates how one indicator can
distort the rankings based on the CIP index. Thailand has clearly outperformed
the Philippines in the past two decades, which is evident in the structure and size
of the manufacturing sector. However, the quirk in the export structure of the
Philippines—where it is ranked second only to Japan in terms of share of me-
dium- and high-tech exports—results in a higher CIP ranking compared to Thai-
land.6 This quirk also narrows the gap considerably between the Philippines, and
the United States and Singapore.
A detailed analysis of individual variables will also be more useful in the
design of a policy intended to improve competitiveness.  The example in the Ap-
pendix compares Malaysia with the Philippines. There, supplementary measures
such as the ratio of value added in a particular sector to total exports of that sector
are discussed.
The potential set focuses on five variables directly relevant to an industry:
skills, technological effort, inward foreign direct investment, royalty and techni-
cal payments, and modern infrastructure. These factors are quite similar to those
listed in the GCR except for “effective intellectual property laws that promote
research and development.” The latter is less relevant for developing countries
that are improving their technological capability through a catch-up process.
6 This “quirk” will be explained in the appendix.
CIP Manufacturing Manufactured Share of Share of
ranking value-added exports medium- medium-
per capita per capita and hitech and hitech
in manufac- in manufac-
turing value turing value
added added
US 6 7 26 6 5
Singapore 1 4 1 1 3
Philippines 25 60 44 42 2
Thailand 32 44 34 38 25
Source: UNIDO (2002)
Table 2. Ranking of the United States, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand based
on four indicators (using 1998 data)PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 14
ENHANCING COMPETITIVENESS: THEORETICAL CONSIDER-
ATIONS
Granted that technological capability is at the center of competitiveness, the evo-
lution of national competitiveness would likely follow the stages of technological
development. An illustrative sequence is provided in the GCR.7 At low levels of
development, economic growth is determined primarily by the mobilization of
primary factors of production. As economies move from low- to middle-income
status, global competitiveness becomes investment-driven, wherein economic
growth is increasingly achieved by harnessing global technologies for local pro-
duction. Foreign direct investments, joint ventures and outsourcing arrangements
help integrate the national economy into international production systems, thereby
facilitating the improvement of technologies and the inflows of foreign capital
and technologies that support economic growth.
In most economies, the evolution from middle-income to high-income sta-
tus involves the transition from a technology-improving economy to a technol-
ogy-generating economy, one that innovates in some sectors at the global technol-
ogy frontier. The principal factors that contribute to global competitiveness, and
thereby improved living standards, will therefore differ for economies at different
levels of development. For example, the main challenge for many middle-income
developing economies is to make connections with international production sys-
tems by attracting sufficient flows of foreign direct investments.
In this context, attention is now directed to the role of government policy in
enhancing international competitiveness. How can the government accelerate the
progress of an economy through the various stages of technological development?
What would be its role? The debate can be resolved by examining the contending
positions and determining which is closest to historical experience. In its simpli-
fied form, there are currently two broad approaches to technology in economies:
neoclassical—including endogenous growth theory—and evolutionary.8 Other
variants allude to a capacity versus capability debate, and accumulation versus
assimilation.
In a neoclassical world, technology development takes place under highly
simplified assumptions: small, homogeneous firms operating in perfectly com-
petitive markets, where all technological options are known (that is, “well-be-
haved” production functions), choices are made without any costs, to optimize
allocation on the basis of capital/labor costs, and technology is absorbed and used
without further effort or cost. In this world, technical change takes the form of
7 Lifted from Porter et al. (2001).
8 The description of the two schools of thought is lifted from Lall (2001b).YAP 15
shifts of the function resulting from exogenous innovation—in traditional mod-
els—or from firm’s optimizing R&D choices with predictable outcomes—in en-
dogenous growth models. Firms do not need to learn to use existing technologies,
and they operate in isolation, without interlinkages and spillovers. Government
intervention in this framework is very limited. The assumptions lead to the con-
clusion that free markets optimize resources as long as they are efficient: market
failures are possible but of limited significance.
The other approach is more structuralist in nature, and draws upon the evo-
lutionary theory of economic growth. In evolutionary theory, firms work neither
with full information on technological alternatives, nor with instantaneous and
costless mastery of existing technologies, nor in isolation from other firms. They
operate instead with imperfect, rather hazy and variable, knowledge of the tech-
nologies they are using. They need time and effort to learn to use technologies
efficiently, and to produce some technological effort. Technical choice, mastery
of technologies, minor improvements or adaptations, and major technological in-
novations, are part of the continuum of technical efforts, undertaken in a relatively
risky and unpredictable world where understanding of information and forecasts
of the future are imperfect. Firms cope, not by maximizing a clear and well-de-
fined objective function, but by developing organizational and managerial rou-
tines. These routines are adapted over time as new information is collected, expe-
rience accumulated and other firms imitated.
As mentioned earlier, the GCR framework adheres more closely to the neo-
classical approach. This is implicit in the above discussion wherein progress through
the various stages of development seems like a seamless process. In reality, how-
ever, the existence of market failure prevents the optimal allocation of resources,
which results in an uneven growth path. The diverse and widespread nature of
market failures in developing countries is well known, especially in industrial
technology and development (Lall 2001a).
Lall goes on to argue that in imperfect markets, there are valid issues con-
cerning national competitive ability, which Krugman (1996) accepts fully. How-
ever, Lall seems to confuse the issue of defining national competitiveness—which
he apparently considers valid only in the presence of market failure—and laying
down the case for competitive strategy (i.e., government intervention). Neverthe-
less, he makes the compelling argument that the main aim of a competitiveness
strategy in the presence of market failure is to help countries realize or build a
dynamic comparative advantage.
Two general types of government intervention are identified. Functional
interventions are intended to improve markets—in particular, factor markets—
without favoring particular activities. Provision of basic infrastructure and free
education are the primary examples of the so-called “market friendly” approach.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 16
Krugman (1996) acknowledges the role and efficacy of functional interventions.
The GCR framework also accepts the necessity of this type of intervention.
On the other hand, selective interventions approach target particular activi-
ties and in its extreme form this approach has been identified with the strategy of
“picking winners.” Meanwhile, Lall (2001b) has argued for a third category of
interventions that lies between selective and functional. Termed “horizontal,”  this
third category refers to policies that promote selected activities across sectors.
Horizontal policies address those  market activities that are missing or particu-
larly difficult to create in developing countries, especially in the technology field
(e.g., subsidizing R&D). This type of intervention is largely consistent with the
evolutionary approach to technological development.
Government intervention can also be justified with regard influencing ex-
port structure, since the latter is not flexible nor fully responsive to changing fac-
tor prices. From a structuralist viewpoint, export structures are path dependent
and difficult to change. They are the outcome of long, cumulative processes of
learning, agglomeration, institution-building and business culture. Moving from
low-technology structure to a high-technology one is thus difficult, and may in-
volve a broad and integrated set of policy interventions.9
For example, the development of the semiconductor industry in East Asia
provides a very interesting and illuminating case study. The creation of new knowl-
edge-intensive, high-technology industries in East Asia,  where semiconductor is
the most prominent, has been described as the real miracle in the region (Matthews
and Cho 2000). Rather than pursue a conventional R&D-led innovation strategy,
firms in East Asia appear instead to have perfected a strategy of leveraging ad-
vanced technology as the principal resource for participation in high-technology
industries. The strategy is based on the creation in these countries of an institu-
tional framework, which involves both public and private sectors and provides a
capacity not just to receive the imported technology and knowledge associated
with it, but to absorb, adapt, diffuse or disseminate, and ultimately improve it
through the efforts of indigenous technologists and engineers.
Based on East Asia’s experience, five characteristics of high-technology
industrialization in the region can be outlined:10
✦ New high-technology industries were created not through the sponta-
neous diffusion of industries or production systems from advanced
countries, but by a deliberate act of policy designed and implemented
by the countries themselves.
9 This argument is made by Lall (2000). This is related to the proposal that the indicators of the CIP are better
analyzed individually. Recall that the export structure is one of the four indicators.
10 This part was lifted from Matthews and Cho (2000), pages 4-21.YAP 17
✦ High-technology creation in East Asia was achieved by managing tech-
nological diffusion via imitation, leverage and learning, rather than by
generating firms’ R&D-led knowledge.
✦ Technological capability was enhanced through resource leverage (i.e.,
by harnessing collaborative networks and competition between sophis-
ticated firms in a developmental, “catch-up” institutional setting).
✦ The process was effected through industry “nurturing” rather than “pro-
tection,” with industry policy evolving as the industries themselves
took root and diffused via “governed interdependence” between state
agencies and industries.
✦ The process of high-technology industry creation was iterative, with
each cycle leading to the enhancement of technological capabilities
and ultimately to industrial sustainability, accomplished within “na-
tional systems of economic learning.” This term is preferred over “na-
tional system of innovation” since the emphasis is on knowledge diffu-
sion rather than knowledge generation.
Policymakers must realize that the context of policy making has changed
significantly over the past two decades. The international rules of the game dis-
courage or rule out policies that were implemented by the newly industrialized
countries (NICs), such as those on selective import protection, local content re-
quirements, export subsidies, and performance and entry rules for foreign inves-
tors (Lall 2001b). However, there are also benefits from the more open and trans-
parent regime, including greater access to Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) markets, and international capital and technology
flows. The challenge now is to design competitiveness policies that would over-
come market failures without violating the international rules of the game.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 18
APPENDIX A
A look at the electronics sector of Malaysia
and the Philippines
The study of the World Bank on the East Asia miracle was designed to resolve the
debate on the role of industrial policy in economic development. The distinction be-
tween functional and selective interventions originated from this study. While it ac-
knowledged the positive contribution of selective policy, the World Bank study cau-
tioned against any attempts to replicate the policies followed by Japan, Korea, Chinese
Taipei and Singapore. In their view, the conditions that underpinned the success of
these strategies—referring to the special historical, political and cultural circumstances
that enabled competent, meritocratic, and insulated technocracies to succeed—are un-
likely to prevail elsewhere.
The report further argued that Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand “may show the
way for the next generation of developing economies to follow export-push strategies;”
unlike the Northeast Asian economies, these three countries followed strategies court-
ing foreign direct investments and creating a favorable environment for exporters with-
out resorting to policies of financial repression and industrial targeting. Thus, the World
Bank study claims that the Southeast Asian second-tier NICs have grown rapidly by
relying on market forces and on minimal but appropriate and generally supportive (i.e.,
functional) interventions.
Several studies have disputed this version of the development process of the
Southeast Asian NICS (Jomo 1997; Rasiah 2003). Contrary to the World Bank study,
these studies claimindustrial policy played a significant role in the transformation of
these economies. An analysis of the electronics sector in two countries will help shed
light on this debate.
Malaysia and the Philippines are two countries that benefited from plunging into
the global value chain of the electronics sector but gained contrasting results. Depend-
ing on the data presented and the author cited, one would get different impressions
regarding the performance and prospects of these two countries. Data in Table A1 show
the distribution of manufactured exports by technological categories. The Philippines
has a larger share of high-technology exports, which are mostly electronics.  Lall (2000)
observes that the Philippine economy has been expanding because of multinational
corporations (MNCs) in the electronics industry, where it has already overtaken Malay-
sia in semiconductor exports. Its cheap, technically proficient and English-speaking
manpower is the major competitive asset.
On the other hand, Lall (2001b) argues that Malaysia has achieved a technologi-
cally-sophisticated export structure despite having few of the attributes of a mature
industry. These would include a diverse manufacturing base with capital goods manu-
facturing capabilities, a well-developed local supplier and subcontracting system with
large “clusters” of high-technology activities, a well-educated and technically trained
workforce, and significant R&D both within and outside enterprises. Lall maintains that
Malaysia’s performance is based on high-tech export-oriented foreign direct investments
that entered the country more by chance than by intent.YAP 19
However, Table A2 shows that Malaysia has a more developed domestic manufac-
turing sector than the Philippines. Moreover, the value added in the electronics sector as
a ratio of total electronics exports has consistently been higher in Malaysia (Table A3).
Since exchange rate movements after 1997 distorted the trend, the value-added ratio in
the electronics sector to GDP is also reported (Table A4). The performance of Malaysia
far outstrips that of the Philippines in this aspect.
The enigma of a high-technology export structure in the Philippines continues to
be demystified. The bulk of these exports are actually re-exports. Hence, the Philippines
has been used as a major transshipment point, resulting in low value added from elec-
tronics exports.  The concentration of exports in one category can also be problematic
once the boon in the semiconductor industry fades. Lall (2001b) also contends that it is
inappropriate for labor-intensive activities to decline at this stage of Philippine economic
development.
Surprisingly, the unit labor cost in the electronics sector in Malaysia has generally
been higher than in the Philippines between 1990 and 1997 (Table A5). This pattern
implies two things. One, there has been considerable effort to upgrade the technologi-
cal structure of Malaysia’s  manufacturing sector in line with the rising unit labor cost.
Two, unit labor cost is definitely a weak indicator of competitiveness.
The variance in their performances may be partly attributed to the earlier begin-
nings of the electronics sector in Malaysia. A more detailed analysis would also reveal a
Resource Based Low Tech Medium Tech High Tech
Malaysia 16.7 11.0 20.3 52.1
Philippines 7.2 14.5 10.9 67.4
Source: Lall (2000)
Note: A similar table was published in UNIDO (2002) but the numbers do not add up to 100.
Table A1. Shares of total manufactured exports by technological categories, 1998
Resource Based Low Tech Medium Tech High Tech
Malaysia 34.0 18.4 11.3 36.2
Philippines 50.9 12.9 18.1 18.1
Source of Basic Data:UNIDO Industrial Statistics, 1996–2002. ISIC Classification based on the SITC classifi-
cations applied by Lall (2000).
Notes: Data for Malaysia are for 1997. The UNIDO Industrial Development Report 2002 publishes similar data
for 1998 but combines the first two categories and the last two. Data for the Philippines are consis-
tent but not for Malaysia (the ratio in the UNIDO report is 60:40 while the ratio above is 47.5:52.4).
One reason may be that Malaysia did not conduct a manufacturing sector survey in 1998.
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divergence in technology policy. Industrial policy in Malaysia has generally been per-
ceived as having inter-ethnic redistribution as its overriding objective, resulting in a
great deal of inefficiency. The dualism between its import-substituting sector—which
experienced a revival under the program of heavy industrialization in the early 1980s—
and the export-oriented sector, is also deemed an offshoot of poorly conceived and
managed government intervention. These considerations, though by no means a con-
sensus view, often overshadow other policy interventions, which have been designed
and sometimes implemented on a more careful basis (e.g., the Malaysian Industrial
Master Plan for 1986-1995 or its 1990 technology development policy [Jomo 1997]).
The more successful interventions did help shape the  semiconductor industry in
Malaysia and built up the capabilities needed to develop an indigenous industry. In the
earlier years, a Singapore-style development agency, the Penang Development Corpo-
ration, was established to leverage skills and business from multinational corporations.
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Malaysia 24.03 22.47 20.81 19.26 22.51 21.10 NA 17.63 NA
Philippines 17.43 15.61 14.99 13.92 11.72 10.01 6.35 6.48 7.04
Source of Basic Data: PCTAS, various years; National Income Accounts of the Philippines; and Monthly Statis-
tical Bulletin (publication of Bank Negara Malaysia), August 2002.
Table A3. Value added as a percentage of total exports, electronics sector
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Malaysia 5.7 6.6 7.5 8.8 9.4 11.1 13.0 16.9 14.5
Philippines 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.4 2.9
Source of Basic Data: National Income Accounts, Philippines; and Monthly Statistical Bulletin (publication of
Bank Negara Malaysia), various issues.
Table A4. Ratio of value added in electronics sector to GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
1.29 1.35 1.03 1.11 0.96 1.16 1.33 1.42 NA
Source of Basic Data: UNIDO Industrial Statistics, 1996 – 2002.
Note: Data available only up to 1998. Malaysia did not conduct a survey of the manufacturing sector in
1998.
Table A5. Ratio of unit labor costs  in the electronics sector (Malaysia/Philippines)YAP 21
More recently, Malaysia has made a breakthrough in the electronics sector with the start
of front-end wafer fabrication. Critical to this development has been the creation of
advanced infrastructure and R&D support, such as the Kulim High-Technology Park in
Kedah, and the Malaysian Institute of Microelectronic Systems (Matthews and Cho 2000).
There is a way to summarize Malaysia’s experience and reconcile it with the earlier
critique by Lall. Among Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, only the latter attempted to
build the institutions necessary to stimulate structural upgrading in firms—particularly in
the 1990s—much of which, however, have been eclectically implemented. These eclectic
strategies have reduced Malaysia’s potential for long-term solutions (Rasiah 2003).
On the other hand, protectionism and government intervention have been cited
as the factors behind the stagnation of the Philippine economy. More outward-oriented
policies were implemented beginning the early 1970s, and the orthodox economic pro-
gram was accelerated in the 1990s. Ironically, the relatively low value added in the
electronics sector is primarily attributed to the lack of political will to implement a com-
prehensive policy that will promote information technology as an industry (Austria 2000).
Other factors of course include infrastructure and institutional bottlenecks, and the lack
of specialized skills for high value-added IT products, which generally require both func-
tional and selective government interventions. Nevertheless, the religious adherence of
Philippine economic managers to orthodox economic programs may have resulted in
more passive policies with regard multinational corporations.11 An industrial policy that
targeted activities for entry by local firms, or one that encouraged technological up-
grading was never seriously considered.
11  One can distinguish between a passive foreign direct investments-dependent strategy and a strategic for-
eign direct investments-dependent one. The latter is characterized by strong efforts to upgrade MNCs, direct
investments into higher value-added activities, and induce existing affiliates to upgrade their technologies and
functions. On the other hand, the passive strategy relies on market forces to upgrade the structure. The main
tools are a welcoming foreign direct investment regime, strong incentives for exports with good export infra-
structure, and cheap, trainable labor.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2004 22
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